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Introduction
The air pollution control program is the crown jewel of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), an agency that often
develops “the state of the art” in regulation generally.1 Officially called
the Office of Air and Radiation (OAR),2 the air program has achieved
most of the public health benefits3 of our five-decade-long crusade to
†

E. Donald Elliott is the Florence Rogatz Visiting Professor at Yale Law
School and a Distinguished Adjunct Professor at George Mason University’s
Antonin Scalia School of Law. He was the Environmental Protection
Agency’s Assistant Administrator and General Counsel from 1989–1991.

1.

See The Clean Air Act: Solving Air Pollution Problem with Science and
Technology, EPA, https://epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/clean-air-actsolving-air-pollution-problems-science-and-technology [httsp://perma.cc/
G42X-XP38] (last updated May 28, 2020) (explaining that the EPA uses
“state-of-the-art analyses” to implement the Clean Air Act).

2.

See About the Office of Air and Radiation (OAR), EPA,
https://epa.gov/aboutepa/about-office-air-and-radiation-oar [https://
perma./cc/SFXY-Y5PS] (last updated May 5, 2020).

3.

Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act 1990–2020, the Second
Prospective Study, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/
benefits-and-costs-clean-air-act-1990-2020-second-prospective-study [https://
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“save the planet.” It is time to undertake a sober assessment of both
strengths and weakness of air-pollution regulation to learn lessons for
future regulatory programs.
To its credit, the OAR has made measurable progress in reducing
every type of air pollution it has targeted. The main features of the
U.S. system of regulating air pollution—“cooperative federalism,”4
notice and comment rulemaking, benefit–cost analysis, and citizens’
suits—were all innovations in 1970 when the effort began; today, they
are proven regulatory techniques. While the system has been expensive,
it has achieved significant progress and credibly claims benefits to
public health and productivity many times its costs.
On the negative side, the United States’ method of regulating air
pollution has been criticized as slow and inefficient.5 As discussed below,
in some instances it has required thirty years or more to achieve the
EPA’s objectives.6 These long delays are, in the main, not the EPA’s
fault. They result in part from the method of regulation mandated by
Congress, which relies on the EPA’s compiling an extensive scientific
record, followed by public-notice-and-comment rulemaking, judicial
review by generalist judges, state implementation, and finally, enforce–
ment, primarily through civil litigation.7 This system of rulemaking, like
everything made by humans, has its strengths and weaknesses. On one
hand, the EPA has been remarkably successful over a generation at
using its interpretive “Chevron discretion”8 to cope with structural
weaknesses that were built into the program by Congress from its
inception, such as “grandfathering” existing plants and using states as
the primary units for implementation while many air pollution problems
are regional in their nature. The U.S. system of regulation takes a long
time to implement, but eventually it generates specific air-pollution
limits that are verifiable and enforceable for the thousands and
perma.cc/5582-WZ3X] (“In 2020, the Clean Air Act Amendments
will prevent over 230,000 early deaths. Most of the economic
benefits (about 85[%]) are attributable to reductions in premature
mortality associated with reductions in ambient particulate matter.”)
(last updated Jan. 4, 2017).
4.

Cooperative Federalism at EPA, EPA, https://epa.gov/home/cooperativefederalism-epa [https://perma.cc/92A9-36RR] (last updated June 1, 2020).

5.

See infra Part II.B.

6.

See infra Part II.B.

7.

See infra Part II.B.

8.

See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865 (1984) (holding that administrative agencies are entitled to
“deference” where Congress did not decide the issue and “the regulatory
scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the manner in a
detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling
conflicting policies”).
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thousands of major sources of air pollution of multiple types, which
greatly enhances enforceability.9
On the negative side, the OAR has generally been reluctant to use
monetary incentives in addition to command-and-control rules to
regulate polluters. This is partly cultural, but it also results from an
unfortunate misunderstanding of the EPA’s authority to impose “user
fees” for use of the atmosphere for waste disposal.10 While many of the
advantages of economic-incentive systems have been touted in the
academic literature, including cost savings and stimulating innovation,11
it has generally not been recognized that the economic incentives to
reduce pollution created by either tradeable permits or user fees take
effect immediately, while command-and-control rules typically take
years to roll out. Moreover, once a source has a command-and-control
limit in place, it has little or no incentive to reduce pollution below the
legal limit and may even be reluctant to develop new techniques that
it would then have to apply as “best available control technology” at
its other locations.
This Article suggests that in the future the OAR, and the EPA
generally, should consider charging user fees to create incentives to
reduce pollution in addition to setting maximum pollution limits.12 It is
hard to imagine that at this late date Congress would substitute either
tradeable permits or emissions fees for the existing system of regulatory
limits; however, in order to speed up the pace of reductions in air
pollution, it might be attractive politically to enact a provision giving
polluters the option to opt out of the existing system of command-andcontrol regulation, with all of its regulatory red tape and delays, if they
cut their existing pollution permitted under the current system by a
significant amount, such as 10–25%, and paid an emissions fee on the
pollution that they continue to emit.13 Because such a system would
both reduce pollution and cut red tape, it might even be possible to
enact it on a bipartisan basis. In some limited instances, the EPA might
even be able to do something like this under its existing statutory
9.

E. Donald Elliott, U.S. Environmental Law in Global Perspective: Five
Do’s and Five Don’ts from Our Experience, 5 Nat’l Taiwan U. L. Rev.
144, 147 (2010).

10.

See infra note 160 and accompanying text.

11.

See Marshall J. Breger et al., Providing Economic Incentives in
Environmental Regulation, 8 Yale J. Reg. 463, 468–69 (1991).

12.

See E. Donald Elliott, EPA’s Existing Authority to Impose a Carbon
“Tax”, 49 Envt’l L. Rep. News & Analysis 10919, 10921 (2019)
(arguing that the EPA has existing statutory authority under the
Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 137-376, 65
Stat. 268, to impose “user fees” for releases of air pollution into the
public’s air).

13.

See infra p. 30.
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authority to approve an “alternative equivalent program” under Section
172(e) of the Clean Air Act.14

I.

EPA Regulation of Air Pollution Has Achieved
Measurable Progress.

The OAR has led a revolution in public health and well-being. To
those who did not live through this transformation of our air, it is hard
to imagine. When I first moved to Washington, D.C. in the mid-1960s,
the smog was so thick that I could not see across the street. Breathing
the acrid air burned inside your nose and hurt your lungs; today, that
never happens in Washington, and is rare elsewhere. The photo below
compares New York’s air in 1973 (on the left) and 2013 (on the right).15

Two-thirds of our population lives in areas that meet all of the
EPA’s minimum air-quality standards, but about one-third (roughly
137 million people) live in areas that still violate one or more of them.16
However, the standards today are more stringent; overall, the air is
definitely getting cleaner, but more work remains to be done.
Some criticize the EPA’s air-pollution record, but in the main, they
are constructive critics who argue that we could have done better.17
Overall, however, almost everyone agrees that regulation of air
14.

See Memorandum from Stephen Page, Dir., Off. of Air Quality Planning
& Standards, to Regional Air Division Directors, Regions I–X, at 2 (Jan.
5, 2010) (arguing that EPA has authority to adopt an “equivalent
alternative program” under Section 172(e)), available at https://www.epa
.gov/ground-level-ozone-pollution/guidance-developing-fee-programsrequired-clean-air-act-section-185 [https://perma.cc/KT6A-MFDQ].

15.

History of Reducing Air Pollution from Transportation in the United States,
EPA, https://epa.gov/transportation-air-pollution-and-climate-change/
accomplishments-and-success-air-pollution-transportation [https://perma.cc/
YU7B-6JSA] (last updated Jan. 23, 2020).

16.

Air Quality—National Summary, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/airtrends/air-quality-national-summary [https://perma.cc/WM2Q-9X8R] (last
updated July 8, 2019).

17.

See infra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
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pollution is one of the major successes of federal policy in the twentieth
century.
The EPA has racked up many impressive achievements in reducing
in air pollution, including:
•

eliminating lead from gasoline;18

•

promulgating and progressively reducing national ambientair-quality standards (NAAQS), requiring states to reduce
dramatically the concentrations of six ubiquitous pollutants
in the air, primarily from factories and power plants burning
fossil fuels;19

•

phasing out chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and (HCFCs), which
were damaging the ozone layer;20

•

reducing significantly air pollutants from automobile tailpipes
and motor fuels;21 and

•

requiring over 140 categories of industry to install technology
to control emissions of toxic air pollutants.22

The agency itself reports major air-quality improvements:
Between 1990 and 2017, national concentrations of air pollutants
improved 80[%] for lead, 77[%] for carbon monoxide, 88[%] for
sulfur dioxide (1-hour), 56[%] for nitrogen dioxide (annual), and
22[%] for ozone. Fine particle concentrations (24-hour) improved

18.

Prohibition on Gasoline Containing Lead or Lead Additives for Highway
Use, 61 Fed. Reg. 3832, 3832 (Feb. 2, 1996) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).

19.

See Criteria Air Pollutants, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/criteria-airpollutants [https://perma.cc/9FLE-4DXY] (last updated Mar. 8, 2018).

20.

Phaseout of Ozone-Depleting Substances (ODS), EPA, https://www.epa
.gov/ods-phaseout [https://perma.cc/U5VH-K69Z] (last updated Jan. 16,
2020).

21.

See Regulations to Reduce Mobile Source Pollution, EPA, https://www
.epa.gov/mobile-source-pollution/regulations-reduce-mobile-source-pollution
[https://perma.cc/CRA6-6YJF] (last updated Mar. 20, 2017).

22.

See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
(NESHAP), EPA, https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/
national-emission-standards-hazardous-air-pollutants-neshap-9 [https://
perma.cc/N3BL-V7ME] (listing examples of regulatory requirements)
(last updated Oct. 15, 2019).
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40[%] and coarse particle concentrations (24-hour) improved
34[%] between 2000 . . . and 2015.23

This progress in reducing ubiquitous air pollutants, primarily from
burning fossil fuels in power plants and factories and pollution controls
on automobiles, is shown graphically below for the period 1980–2005.24

23.

Progress Cleaning the Air and Improving People’s Health, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/progress-cleaning-air-andimproving-peoples-health [https://perma.cc/M5DY-NZXS] (last updated
Aug. 14, 2019).

24.

Joel Schwartz, Facts Not Fear on Air Pollution, Nat’l Ctr. for Pol’y
Analysis (Dec. 11, 2006), http://www.ncpathinktank.org/pub/st294?pg=3
[https://perma.cc/ R4W5-RALM].
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These reductions in air pollution were achieved without stifling
economic growth, as is shown in the chart below.25

The air program also pioneered innovations including “cap and
trade” programs, such as the 1979 “bubble” policy and the 1990 acid
rain-trading program, which achieved a 50% reduction of sulfur oxide
pollution from electric utility power plants at a fraction of the cost of
conventional command-and-control regulation.26
But at the same time, the U.S. system of regulating air pollution
has been criticized by the friendly critics as slow, complex, and
legalistic.27 Many of the successful air-pollution-control programs took
twenty years or more to reach fruition.28 In addition, the economic costs
are high, with federal air-quality policies costing an estimated $80
25.

Air Quality—National Summary, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/air-trends/
air-quality-national-summary [https://perma.cc/WM2Q-9X8R] (last
updated July 8, 2019).

26.

Executive Summary—The Clear Skies Initiative, The White House
(Feb. 14, 2002), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2002/02/clearskies.html [https://perma.cc/M7BA-CJDY] (“The
acid rain cap and trade program created by Congress in 1990 reduced
more pollution in the last decade than all other Clean Air Act commandand-control programs combined, and achieved significant reductions at
two-thirds of the cost to accomplish those reductions using a ‘commandand-control’ system. . . . The Acid Rain program enjoys nearly 100[%]
compliance and only takes 75 EPA employees to run—a track record no
command-and-control program can meet.”).

27.

See infra Part II.B.

28.

See infra Part II.B.
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billion (in 2010 dollars) annually.29 But most of this money is in the
form of transfer payments to buy goods and services, such as pollutioncontrol equipment, so it is not a dead weight loss on the economy. These
expenditures produce benefits far in excess of the costs: the EPA
estimates that the quantifiable benefits, primarily in improving human
health and reducing premature mortality, are thirty to ninety times
greater than the costs.30 Most of these benefits come from reducing the
airborne concentrations of very small particles from burning fossil fuels
called “particulate matter.”31 These tiny particles lodge in the lungs and
have been shown in epidemiological studies to reduce life span compared
to people who live in areas with cleaner air.32 There are debates about
the EPA’s estimates of huge health benefits from air-pollution
reductions, but virtually everyone concedes that the benefits have
exceeded the costs; it is just a question of by how much.33
The approach of the air program, like most of the EPA’s other
programs, is a variation of the style of lawmaking described by the
eminent sociologist Robert Kagan as “bureaucratic legalism,” a term he
borrowed from Max Weber.34 There are, however, three important
additions to classic Weberian bureaucracy: (1) broad rights of public
participation, (2) rights of affected citizens to go to court to require the
government to initiate or enforce regulation, and (3) judicial review by
generalist judges.35 Elsewhere I have praised these added features as
among the best features of the American system of environmental law
and I advocated that other countries should consider adopting some or
all of them;36 but they also have substantial costs as well as benefits,
29.

Michelle L. Bell et al., Quantifying the Human Health Benefits of Air
Pollution Policies: Review of Recent Studies and New Directions in
Accountability Research, 14 Envt’l Sci. & Pol’y 357, 357 (2011).

30.

Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act 1990–2020, the Second Prospective
Study, supra note 3.

31.

Id.

32.

Ambient (Outdoor) Air Pollution, WHO (May 2, 2018), https://www
.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/ambient-(outdoor)-air-quality-andhealth [https://perma.ccPJP4-HA2U].

33.

See, e.g., Cong. Research Serv., R44840, Cost and Benefit
Considerations in Clean Air Act Regulations, at ii (2017) (“The
estimated benefits of CAA regulations rely heavily on the effects of
reducing particulate emissions, and on the value placed on the avoidance
of premature death as a result of such controls.”), available at https://
www.everycrsreport.com/files/20170505_R44840_2d99a4fb88ed12a2fd82
2422e7356175cc9c148e.pdf [https://perma.cc/FLE3-6U4E].

34.

Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of
Law 12 (2d ed. 2019).

35.

See generally Clean Air Act § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (2012).

36.

See Elliott, supra note 9.
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primarily in terms of their potential to delay regulatory action, as I
discuss below.37
The air program promulgates binding legal rules, primarily through
a process called notice-and-comment, or informal, rulemaking. That
process notifies the public of a proposed rule or rule change and gives
it a chance to submit written comments about those proposals. The
EPA must then respond in writing and on the public record to
significant comments, explaining why it did or did not change the draft
rule in response to the comments. Both the written comments and the
EPA’s responses form part of the record for judicial review.
Notice-and-comment rulemaking has existed since 1946, but its use
was greatly expanded in the early 1970s when courts began to allow
agencies to develop legally binding regulatory standards using noticeand-comment, rather than trial-type, procedures.38 Before the expansion
of notice-and-comment rulemaking, it is virtually impossible to imagine
a federal regulator, such as the OAR, with the capacity to impose limits
on the discharges of various types of pollutants from hundreds of
different types of industrial processes at thousands of plants throughout
the country, to establish binding legal norms; federal regulatory
agencies simply did not have the necessary information-processing
capacity.39 Thus, the expansion of federal regulatory authority over air
pollution was made possible by the expansion of notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures, which enabled the government to develop
specific, enforceable limits on individual polluting facilities.
The air program also issues “guidance documents.”40 These
documents give advance notice of the positions that the agency is likely
to take in enforcement litigation. The public does not routinely get a
chance to comment on guidance documents as they do on rules, but at
least in legal theory, guidance documents are not binding upon persons
outside the agency.41 Still, if one wants to avoid the risk and expense of
37.

See infra Part II.B.

38.

See Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 626
(1973); Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law 149 (2d ed. 1984)
(noting that, during the 1970s, the “center of gravity” of government
policymaking shifted into the notice-and-comment rulemaking process.)
The use of administrative rulemaking to impose binding legal requirements
continues to be controversial in some quarters. See generally Philip
Hamburger, The Administrative Threat (2017).

39.

See Antonin Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law Without Making Rules,
Regulation, July–Aug. 1981, at 25, 26–27.

40.

Significant Guidance Documents—Air, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/lawsregulations/significant-guidance-documents-air [https:/perma.cc/XA8M9W48] (last updated June 4, 2020).

41.

See McLouth Steel Products Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1322, 1324
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that regulated parties must be allowed to
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litigation, one pays close attention to the safe harbors that the EPA
provides through guidance and disregards them only at the peril of
facing an EPA-enforcement suit.
Both rules and the application of guidance to a particular situation
are subject to judicial review. Those who can sue include not only
affected industries and states that contend that EPA has required too
much,42 but also citizens’ groups43 and companies and states that feel
that EPA has done too little.44 The opportunity for citizens,
environmental groups, and companies that favor more stringent
regulation to go to court to force the agency to do more does not exist
in most other countries. In addition, citizens and states, as well as the
EPA, can also sue to enforce the rules already on the books.45 Both
types of litigation are called “citizens’ suits,” although they are of two
different types. Elsewhere I have argued that such citizens’ suits are
one of the best features of U.S. environmental law and should be
emulated by other countries.46 But like judicial review generally, they
also impose costs in both money and time.

II. The Critics Argue We Could Have Done Even
Better.
Despite the EPA’s progress in cleaning up the air, which is
objectively measurable and thus hard to deny, a number of critics,
particularly in the academy, do mount limited critiques of the air

challenge guidance when it is applied because it is non-binding policy
rather than a legislative rule); Peter Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum,
41 Duke L.J. 1463, 1468 (1992) (discussing rules that bind only the
government body that made them versus those that bind the entire
public); Notice of Administrative Conference of the United States’
Adoption of Recommendation 2017-5: Agency Guidance Through Policy
Statements 82 Fed. Reg. 61,728, 61,734 (Dec. 29, 2017) (providing a list
of available administrative documents and recommendations, and
explaining the importance of agency guidance through policy statements).
See generally Robert Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind
Citizens and the Courts?, 7 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 17 (1990) (complaining
that some guidance documents are binding as a practical matter).
42.

Jeffrey G. Miller, Citizen Suits: Private Enforcement of
Federal Pollution Control Laws 17–18 (1987).

43.

Id. at 19–20.

44.

Id. at 18.

45.

Elliott, supra note 9, at 152.

46.

Id.
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program.47 Most of them, including my own,48 are speculative, quali–
tative, and ultimately friendly, in the sense that they merely
hypothesize that we might have done even better (or faster, or with less
expense) if we had done something differently.49 That is not surprising,
as most legal academics consider it their mission to speculate about how
public policy might be improved.50
For example, in Professor Peter Schuck’s epic assessment of the
successes and failures of U.S. domestic policy since World War II,51 he
does not rank the EPA’s air program as an unqualified “success.” I
questioned Peter about this omission, and he explained that it was
because he thought that it had been too expensive.52 But of course, that
assessment is hypothetical; we do not have access to an alternative
universe in which the same progress in reducing air pollution was
achieved at lower cost by doing something different.
A more strident critic is David Schoenbrod, a Trustee Professor at
New York University Law School and a former litigator for the Natural
Resources Defense Council. In a blog post on the fortieth anniversary
of the EPA’s establishment, Professor Schoenbrod argued the “the
Clean Air Act is in no shape to be celebrated”:
It is appropriate to celebrate past successes, but in truth the
Clean Air Act cannot handle today’s pollution problems, and not
just those caused by greenhouse gases. EPA has found that
traditional pollutants continue to harm public health, but the
Clean Air Act, a statute passed in 1970 during the dawn of
environmentalism, mandates an ineffective, inefficient response: a
requirement that each state adopt its own plan to control
47.

See generally id.

48.

Id. at 160–65; E. Donald Elliott, The Case for Trimming the EPA, The
Atlantic (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/
2012/03/the-case-for-trimming-the-epa/254701 [https://perma.cc/FC8SXDD8].

49.

See Elliott, supra note 9, at 160–65.

50.

For example, Milton Friedman, the winner of the Nobel Prize for
economics in 1976, once wrote:
Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. When
that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas
that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function [as
academics]: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep
them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes
politically inevitable.
Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, at ix (2d ed. 1982).

51.

See generally Peter H. Schuck, Why Government Fails So Often:
And How It Can Do Better (2014).

52.

Personal communication with Professor Peter Schuck.
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emissions. Congress should replace the state plan requirement
with federal market-based regulation.53

I share David’s concern that, to date, the air program has been
unable to regulate greenhouse gases in a way that will survive judicial
review or win bipartisan political support.54 And I also share his belief
that greater reliance on economic incentives would be desirable,55
although I believe we should integrate economic incentives with tradi–
tional command-and-control regulation, not replace the existing system
entirely.56
David goes on to identify three specific problems with the air
program but it is notable that all three can be laid at the doorstep of
Congress, not the EPA:
The assumptions behind that 1970 scheme no longer hold true.
First, Congress assumed back then that each state’s pollution
came almost entirely from smokestacks within that state and, on
that basis, required each state to adopt a formal plan to cut
pollution. Experience has shown, however, that much pollution
comes from other states and even other nations. Yet, the state
plan requirement remains the Clean Air Act’s major program.
Second, Congress assumed in 1970 that the best way to control
pollution was for the state plan to tell each big factory what to
do. This top-down approach worked well enough when industries
had yet to install well-known, relatively inexpensive control
devices. Today it is far less obvious how to eke out further
progress. To cut pollution further often requires changes in the
industrial processes themselves, changes in small businesses,
buildings, and other small sources, and changes based on
innovation still being worked out. Regulators writing state plans
today cannot know enough to pick the most effective and efficient
ways to further reduce pollution. Yet, the state plan requirement
continues.
Third, Congress assumed in 1970 that each state would design,
implement and enforce a plan sufficient to meet federal
environmental targets. The result has been an overwhelmingly
complex and disappointingly ineffective program. According to a
2004 National Research Council study, the state plan requirement
53.

David Schoenbrod, The Clean Air Act Is in No Shape to Be Celebrated,
Huffington Post (May 25, 2011), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
david-schoenbrod/the-clean-air-act-is-in-n_b_704631.html [https://perma
.cc/7MNC-AL6U].

54.

See infra Part II.A.

55.

See infra Part II.C.

56.

See infra Part II.C.
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is “legalistic,” “often frustrating” and “probably discourages
innovation.” It “overtaxes the limited financial and human
resources available” and “draws attention and resources away
from the more germane issue of ensuring progress.” Yet, the state
plan requirement continues.57

Schoenbrod’s critique is largely focused on a single part of the Clean
Air Act: the system for setting federal National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) under sections 108 and 109 of the Act, which are
mandatory minimum health and welfare-based median quality
standards that states must then develop SIPs (for “state
implementation plans”) to achieve “attainment and maintenance”
under section 110.58 It is true that in the 1970s and into the 1980s the
system of NAAQS and SIPs was the mainstay of federal air-quality
regulation.59 But over time, the EPA has gradually issued a large
number of technology-based federal regulations that apply directly to
major sources of pollution, called New Source Performance Standard
(NSPS) and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
(NESHAPs) under sections 111 and 112 of the Act.60 In retrospect, the
state-based SIP system appears to have been a transitional strategy
between traditional state-based regulation of air pollution and greater
federal regulation.
Others have argued persuasively that Congress made a serious
mistake in only applying these technology-based federal standards to
“new” or “modified” plants (a policy they call “grandfathering”) and
that an approach more like that of the Clean Water Act—gradually
phasing-in federal technology-based standards to existing as well as new
plants—would have been better.61 As discussed below,62 the EPA
eventually used its interpretive and enforcement authority to try to
correct this mistake by Congress, but it has taken a long time and that
job is still not complete. The fact is that Congress did not know in 1970
which regulatory techniques would work best to combat air pollution,
so it gave the EPA a variety of tools to use, although I argue below
that the tools most conspicuous by their absence were economic
incentives, such as emissions fees or tradeable permits.63 Schoenbrod’s
57.

Schoenbrod, supra note 53.

58.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–10 (2012).

59.

See generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 50 (2019) (discussing the development of
NAAQS and SIPs, and grounds for their later revision).

60.

42 U.S.C. §§ 7411–12 (2012).

61.

Richard L. Revesz & Jack Lienke, Struggling for Air: Power
Plants and the “War on Coal” 24–54 (2016).

62.

See infra Part II.B.2.

63.

See infra Part II.C.

907

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 4·2020
A Critical Assessment of the EPA’s Air Program at Fifty and a Suggestion
for How It Might Do Even Better

claim that the NAAQS/SIP system should have been eliminated as
more direct federal technology-based regulation was phased in is more
debatable. Compliance with technology-based standards does not
necessarily eliminate so-called “hot spots,” where health-based limits
are exceeded due to a concentration of pollution sources in a particular
area despite compliance with technology-based standards.64
But if an overriding lesson emerges from Schoenbrod’s critique, it
is that largely due to a legislative “logjam”65 created by the lack of
bipartisan support for most environmental legislation since the 1992
election,66 Congress has largely been absent in the environmental area
and has not made any significant additions or changes to the Clean Air
Act since 1990. This has left the EPA to fend for itself, which has
created or exacerbated the following three basic shortcomings for the
air program.
A.

The Failure of Comprehensive Federal Regulation of Greenhouse
Gases

This is not the place to debate the science of climate change, or
what role human use of fossil fuels and other activities play in causing
it.67 For present purposes, it suffices to note that in 2007, the Supreme
64.

See generally Byron Swift, Allowance Trading and SO2 Hot Spots—Good
News from the Acid Rain Program, 31 Envtl. Rep. 954–59 (2000)
(explaining pollution “hot spots”).

65.

See David Schoenbrod et al., Breaking the Logjam: Environmental
Protection That Will Work (2010); see also E. Donald Elliott, Portage
Strategies for Adapting Environmental Law and Policy During a Logjam
Era, 17 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 24 (2008).

66.

See E. Donald Elliott, Politics Failed, Not Ideas, 28 Envtl. F., Sept.–
Oct. 2011, at 42, 42–43.

67.

I respectfully disagree with much of Professor Carlson’s encomium to the
history of regulation of automobile emissions and her endorsement of the
Green New Deal in this symposium. In both cases, her argument is a “onehanded clap,” in the sense that she does not consider alternatives to either
what occurred in regulating automobiles or how the Green New Deal
proposes to address climate change. Like Professor Carlson, I favor
ambitious goals and timetables. But what the ambitious goals are also
matters, and she gives scant consideration to that. Elsewhere I have
argued that the commitment in the Green New Deal to phase out all fossil
fuel use makes little sense. See E. Donald Elliott, What’s Really Wrong
with the Green New Deal, The Spectator (Apr. 9, 2019, 12:05 AM),
https://spectator.org/whats-really-wrong-with-the-green-new-deal/ [https://
perma.cc/NZ2S-J73X]. It is an example of a common fallacy that I have
named the “process reversal fallacy”: if one thinks that climate change
was caused by too much fossil fuel usage by human beings, it is intuitively
appealing but it does not follow logically or automatically that the proper
remedy is to eliminate fossil-fuel usage. See id. Rather, as I point out in
that article, the solution is going to be a cost-effective combination of
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Court held that the EPA should regulate climate change under the
Clean Air Act unless it could either determine that anthropocentric
emissions were not contributing significantly to climate change or
provide some other valid reason for not regulating greenhouse gas
emissions (GHGs).68 In response, in December 2009, the EPA finalized
an “endangerment finding” that GHGs were in fact contributing to
climate change.69 Despite some public expressions of doubt about the
extent of human contributions to climate change by President Trump,70
to date the Trump Administration has not revoked the endangerment
finding that commits the EPA to regulating GHGs.
And yet, in the thirteen years since Massachusetts v. EPA71 was
decided, the EPA has not managed to develop a comprehensive
program to address GHGs that will withstand judicial and political
review. The Waxman–Markey bill to create a trading system for GHGs,
modeled on the successful acid rain-trading system under the 1990
Clean Air Act amendments, passed the House, but was never brought
up for a vote in the Senate because, even though the Democrats had a
filibuster proof sixty vote majority at the time, it still would not have
passed.72 As President Obama neared his last year in office, his
reducing fossil fuel usage, adaptation, removing carbon dioxide from the
atmosphere, add on pollution controls to remove carbon dioxide from
exhaust streams, and possibly, geo-engineering. See id. More sophisticated
observers of climate change policy, including Mike Vanderburgh and
Jonathan Gilligan, who are also contributors to this symposium, recognize
in their fine book on the role of private governance in fighting climate
change that there is no one single policy that is the magic “silver bullet”
but that is going to take a whole portfolio of policies and initiatives to
achieve climate policy goals. See Michael P. Vandenbergh and
Jonathan M. Gilligan, Beyond Politics: The Private Governance
Response to Climate Change 14 (2017).
68.

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–35 (2007).

69.

Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15,
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I).

70.

See, e.g., Trump Says Climate Change Not a Hoax, Not Sure of Its Source,
The Wash. Times (Oct. 14, 2018), https://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2018/oct/14/trump-says-climate-change-not-a-hoax-not-sure-of-i/
?utm_source=GOOGLE&utm_medium=cpc&utm_id=chacka&utm_
campaign=TWT+-+DSA&gclid=Cj0KCQiAyp7yBRCwARIsABfQsnRK
me5Vutj_roZWWPx0v1-RQdmnRsbKykY3k697CVkLt27Hqz0yA00aAm
OLEALw_wcB [https://perma.cc/5H3K-LXFM].

71.

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497.

72.

See generally John M. Broder, ‘Cap and Trade’ Loses Its Standing as Energy
Policy of Choice, N.Y. Times (Mar. 25, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/
2010/03/26/science/earth/26climate.html (describing the political history
of the Waxman–Markey bill’s demise) [https://perma.cc/K3QY-FB8J];
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administration finally promulgated a “clean power plan” that would
have required future administrations to force states to take regulatory
action a few years later to reduce GHGs from existing fossil-fuel-fired
power plants.73 But the same Supreme Court that only a few years
earlier had pushed the EPA to address climate change took the highly
unusual action of issuing a stay of that regulation on the grounds that
those challenging the plan had a probability of success on the merits of
their challenge that the regulation went beyond the EPA’s authority
under the statutory section in question.74 The Trump Administration
agreed, and revoked the Clean Power Plan.75
Without getting into a blame game as to who is responsible for the
failure of the air program to address climate change successfully, that
omission must be counted as a shortcoming, particularly because it
contrasts with other successful initiatives to address air pollution that
did command broad bipartisan support. For example, the 1990 Clean
Air Act amendments, which created the successful trading program to
address acid rain on a regional basis and strengthened other sections of
the Act, including those relating to air toxics, were passed by a vote of
401–21 in the House of Representatives and 89–11 in the Senate.76
B.

Getting It Right Can Take a Generation

Even for matters on which the EPA’s air program does eventually
get it right and accomplish its air-pollution-control objectives, the
American system of regulating air pollution through “bureaucratic
Sam Zacher, For The Fire This Time: Lessons from Waxman-Markey,
The Trouble (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.the-trouble.com/content/
2018/8/22/for-the-fire-this-time-lessons-from-waxman-markey [https://
perma.cc/S9E6-VPWU].
73.

See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (Oct. 23,
2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). See generally Tomas Carbonell,
EPA’s Proposed Clean Power Plan: Protecting Climate and Public Health
by Reducing Carbon Pollution from the U.S. Power Sector, 33 Yale L.
& Pol’y Rev. 403 (2014) (arguing that the Clean Power Plan represented
a sensible approach from a policy perspective if one were writing on a
clean slate rather than implementing a statutory provision that was not
written with climate change in mind).

74.

Order in Pending Case, West Virginia v. EPA, U.S.S.C. No. 15A773 (Feb.
9, 2016).

75.

Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to
Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July
8, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).

76.

Clean Air Act Overview: 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment Summary,
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/1990-clean-air-actamendment-summary [https://perma.cc/F6XV-Q2ZR] (last updated Jan.
3, 2017).
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legalism,” and in our case with add-ons of extensive opportunities for
public participation and political and judicial review,77 often takes a
generation or more. This is not to contend that the benefits of judicial
review or public participation are not worth the costs, but only to
observe that there are costs, not merely benefits, that must be weighed
in the balance.78
Three examples illustrate the point that the American approach to
air pollution regulation often takes a very long time to achieve its goals.
1.

Eliminating the Lead from Gasoline

One of the air program’s greatest success stories from a publichealth perspective was eliminating the lead from gasoline; however, it
took almost exactly twenty-five years from the time of the EPA’s
original proposal to the consummation of this noble mission.
In the 1970s, 90% of gasoline in the United States contained
tetraethyl lead as an octane booster to prevent high-compression
engines from “knocking” and to lubricate the metal-to-metal contact in
the cylinders.79 Environmental problems occurred because lead is not
destroyed during the combustion of gasoline; instead, small particles of
lead are released from the tailpipe and accumulate along roadways,
particularly in urban areas.80 High levels of lead have been known for
many years to be a neurotoxin, and recent research has shown that
even low levels of lead in the blood can decrease a person’s IQ, result
in hyperactivity disorder, and cause a variety of other adverse health
effects.81 At the time that the EPA began requiring the oil companies
to remove lead from gasoline, no other known additive could replace it,
but the agency was confident that something could be developed, and
it turned out to be right.
The saga of removing lead from gasoline began shortly after the
signing of the Clean Air Act, when in January 1971, the EPA
announced that it was considering promulgating a rule to decrease the
levels of lead in gasoline and to require refiners to sell at least one grade
77.

See supra note 35 and accompanying text.

78.

But see Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial
review of Agency Action, 1989 Duke L. J. 522 (1989) (cataloguing the
benefits of judicial review).

79.

See Gil Oudijk, The Rise and Fall of Organometallic Additives in Automotive
Gasoline, 11 Envtl. Forensics 17, 17, 26 (2010) (explaining the history
behind the use of tetraethyl lead in order to avoid the premature
detonation of fuel).

80.

See, e.g., S.R. Craxford, Pollution from Lead in Petrol, 1 Oil &
Petrochemical Pollution 285, 289 (1983).

81.

Lead, Nat’l Inst. Envtl. Health Sci., https://www.niehs.nih.gov/
health/topics/agents/lead/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/8ZQ3-QFYS] (last
reviewed Dec. 18, 2019).
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of unleaded gasoline.82 In a sense, this was low-hanging fruit because
lead fouled and destroyed the effectiveness of catalytic converters that
were used to capture other pollutants in automobile exhaust;83 but the
proposal was also based on lead’s adverse health effects. The EPA
finalized that rule in 1973, and simultaneously proposed a schedule to
further decrease the lead content of fuels, but to do so gradually and
with significant exceptions.84 Small refiners were exempted entirely from
the first-step decrease in 1975, but were subject to the second step in
1979.85
In a precursor of what would later become the bubble policy and
cap-and-trade programs, refiners were allowed to “pool” their leaded
and unleaded gasoline, so that if they produced more unleaded gasoline,
they could use their fixed allotment of lead to produce some gasoline
with a higher lead content.86 The logic was that this gave refiners
flexibility to find the most cost-effective mix for them to comply with
the new restrictions, while holding constant the total amount of lead
released into the environment. Such a strategy works only because the
environmental harm results from the total amount of lead released to
the environment, not from how much lead is contained in any particular
gallon of gasoline.
The lead-phase-down rule was challenged in the D.C. Circuit and
upheld in a five–four en banc decision in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,87 “a classic
in administrative law.”88 The key issue was not whether high levels of
lead in the blood were damaging, but whether the low levels of lead
contained in gasoline were actually causing harm as opposed to other
more significant sources, such as lead paint. Lead is heavy, so it settles
to the ground rapidly, and it was not thought at the time that lead was
inhaled to any significant degree; rather, the EPA’s legal theory was
that children could get lead dust that was deposited at the curbside
from auto exhaust on their hands and then put their hands into their
mouths, causing them to ingest lead. This pica theory was, frankly,
speculative, and the EPA had no direct proof that lead from gasoline
was actually causing any significant harm.
82.

Regulation of Fuel Additives, 36 Fed. Reg. 1486, 1486 (proposed Jan. 30,
1971) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 479).

83.

Id.

84.

Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 38 Fed. Reg. 1254, 1254 (Jan. 10,
1973) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).

85.

Id. at 1260.

86.

Control of Lead Additives in Gasoline, 38 Fed. Reg. 33,734, 33,739 (Dec.
6, 1973) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).

87.

Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).

88.

Thomas O. McGarity, Radical Technology-Forcing in Environmental
Regulation, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 943, 949 (1994).
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Nonetheless, in a majority opinion by Judge J. Skelly Wright that
prefigures the Chevron doctrine of deferring to administrative
constructions of ambiguous statutory terms,89 the five–four majority
accepted the EPA’s argument that the statutory “will endanger”
standard was “an essentially legislative policy judgment, rather than a
factual determination, balancing the relative risks of under-protection
as compared to overprotection,” and therefore was not to be reviewed
with the rigor customary for questions of fact.90 While Ethyl has never
been explicitly overruled, later cases, including Supreme Court cases,
have not always followed its wise lead that the quantum of science
required to justify regulation is a policy decision rather than an ordinary
question of fact.91
The decisive vote in Ethyl was cast by then-Chief Judge David L.
Bazelon, who confided to his law clerk that while the EPA might not
be able to prove that the lead from gasoline was in and of itself having
significant adverse effects on health, it was “too early” in the
development of environmental science to demand such proof.92 Plus the
risks of stunting the growth and intellectual development of children in
urban ghettos were unacceptable and justified erring on the side of
protecting public health.93 In this Chief Judge Bazelon and the en banc
majority anticipated the precautionary principle that, in the words of
the 1992 Rio Treaty, “[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for

89.

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

90.

Ethyl, 541 F.2d at 20, citing inter alia Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d
722, 740–41 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“Where . . . regulations turn on choices of
policy, on an assessment of risks, or on predictions dealing with matters
on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, we will demand adequate reasons
and explanations, but not ‘findings’ of the sort familiar from the world of
adjudication.”).

91.

See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607, 662 (1980) (remanding OSHA benzene standard for failure to make
a factual finding of a “significant risk” to health); see also Gail Charnley
& E. Donald Elliott, Risk Versus Precaution: Environmental Law and
Public Health Protection, 32 Envtl. L. Inst.: News & Analysis 10,363,
10,363–64 (2002) (criticizing Industrial Union Dep’t, supra, on the
grounds that “by conceiving of risk assessment as fundamentally an issue
of fact, [the decision] subordinates policy considerations . . . [b]y
overemphasizing the factual component of risk assessment . . . [and]
misunderstand[s] the nature of risk assessment”).

92.

Personal communication.

93.

Id.
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postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.”94
Research that became available after the Ethyl decision showed a
significant decline in the levels of lead in the blood of urban children
after the EPA’s regulations went into effect, although a definitive link
between the two could not be established.95 More recent research has
also shown that, contrary to what was known at the time of the Ethyl
decision, “[i]nhalation is the second major pathway of exposure [to lead]
for the general population in the United States.”96 That is an important
lesson from the episode: environmental toxins are only rarely shown to
be less hazardous than initially suspected, but they frequently turn out
to be more hazardous as more, better-designed research is done that is
able to detect harm at lower levels of exposure that were previously
thought to be safe. Past experience in detecting harm at lower and
lower levels counsels in favor of a precautionary approach when the
scientific literature is not yet mature. On the other hand, the dilemma
for regulators is that when precautionary regulation is implemented
based on early evidence suggesting a possible problem, it is difficult to
change regulation later without provoking the accusation that one is
“rolling back” environmental protections.97 This is why the Ethyl court
was wise in holding that the quantum of evidence needed to justify
regulation is a policy decision.
The EPA’s success in Ethyl in 1976 was not the end of the story,
however. In the wake of the Arab Oil embargo and the energy crisis in
the mid-1970s, the EPA came under political pressure and extended the
original 1979 deadline for phasing down the lead content of gasoline
until 1982.98 During the regulatory reform initiatives of the Reagan and
first Bush administrations, the lead phase down again came under

94.

U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26/Rev.1
(Vol. I) (Aug. 12, 1992); see also Communication from the Commission
on the Precautionary Principle, at 10, COM (2000) 1 final (Feb 2, 2000);
Robert V. Percival, Who’s Afraid of the Precautionary Principle, 23 Pace
Envtl. L. Rev. 21, 25 (2006).

95.

See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506,
527–28 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (summarizing results of the CDC’s Second
National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey).

96.

Oscar Tarragó & Mary Jean Brown, Agency for Toxic
Substances & Disease Registry, Lead Toxicity 39 (2017), available
at https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/csem/csem.asp?csem=34&po=6 [https://
perma.cc/5GDW-2RRM].

97.

See Ortwin Renn & E. Donald Elliott, Chemicals, in The Reality
of Precaution: Comparing Risk Regulation in the United States
and Europe 223, 223 (Jonathan B. Wiener et al. eds., 2011).

98.

McGarity, supra note 88, at 949–50.
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attack, and the EPA again compromised temporarily.99 But eventually,
on January 1, 1996, the EPA’s total ban on lead in gasoline became
effective, almost exactly twenty-five years after it had first been
proposed.100 Most of the world eventually followed EPA’s lead. While
the Europeans were a decade behind the United States in removing lead
from gasoline, by the mid-2000s, almost every country in the world had
followed the U.S. example and banned the sale of leaded gasoline.101
Getting the lead out of gasoline was a very good decision in
retrospect from a public health perspective;102 however, it took twentyfive years to complete.103 Some say that the lesson is that environmental
regulation is more likely to succeed against entrenched economic
interests when it is accomplished gradually through a series of steps and
compromises. For example, EPA Administrator Michael Leavitt
maintained “[t]here is no progress to be made at the extremes. Progress
can only be made in the productive center.”104 But the step-by-step
approach can take a very long time, as the removal of lead from gasoline
illustrates.
2.

Ending Grandfathering of Existing Plants

Former N.Y.U. Law School Dean Richard Revesz and his co-author,
Jack Lienke, have argued persuasively in their book, Struggling for
Air,105 that one of the most questionable legislative decisions in the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 was the decision to regulate existing
plants less stringently than new plants, often called “grandfathering.”
Regulating future polluters more stringently than those already
99.

See id.

100. Id.
101. Benjamin Elisha Sawe, Countries That Still Use Leaded Gasoline, World
Atlas (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/countriesthat-still-use-leaded-gasoline.html [https://perma.cc/Q7K5-9XT2].
102. Nick Wilson & John Horrocks, Lessons from the Removal of Lead from
Gasoline for Controlling Other Environmental Pollutants: A Case Study
from New Zealand, 7 Envtl. Health 1–2 (2008).
103. Timeline of Major Accomplishments in Transportation, Air Pollution, and
Climate Change, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/transportation-air-pollutionand-climate-change/timeline-major-accomplishments-transportation-air
[https://perma.cc/SU6U-TFU9] (“EPA completes its 25-year mission to
completely remove lead from gasoline. Lead is banned from gasoline as of
January 1, 1996.”) (last updated Jan. 10, 2017).
104. Michael Janofsky, Nominee for E.P.A. Defends His Job as Utah
Governor, N.Y. Times (Aug. 14, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/
08/14/us/nominee-for-epa-defends-his-job-as-utah-governor.html [https://
perma.cc/2A7F-SEPR].
105. See generally Richard L. Revesz & Jack Lienke, Struggling for
Air: Power Plants and the “War on Coal” (2016).

915

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 4·2020
A Critical Assessment of the EPA’s Air Program at Fifty and a Suggestion
for How It Might Do Even Better

operating often happens because it is less difficult politically to impose
costs on speculative future projects than on existing industries that are
organized and have political clout. But the decision in 1970 to
grandfather polluters out of the stringent air-pollution requirements
that would apply to new or modified sources was also taken because it
seemed intuitively obvious to the drafters that it would be less
expensive to design pollution-control equipment for a new plant than
to retrofit an existing plant.106 They also thought that plants would
retire automatically after about thirty years (not realizing that industry
estimates to that effect were based on the IRS’s depreciation schedule,
and that some plants continue to operate for fifty years or even
longer).107
But the intuitively obvious is not necessarily valid, and it turns out
that installing pollution controls on most old plants is really not much
more difficult or expensive than incorporating them into the designs for
new ones, although an existing plant will typically have a shorter
remaining useful life over which to amortize the capital costs of
installing pollution-control equipment. But this factual error by the
drafters led to a significant policy problem by creating strong incentives
to keep older, dirtier sources online longer because they were cheaper
to operate.
The pollution controls required on a new electric power plant (a
“scrubber” or flue gas desulfurization) are expensive, often costing tens
of millions of dollars.108 Exempting existing power plants from the
stringent pollution-control requirements that applied to new plants
created a cost differential so that electric utilities in competitive
markets had strong incentives to keep their older, dirtier plants online
longer.109
106. Personal Communication with Roger Strelow (the EPA’s First Assistant
Administrator for Air and Waste), who was also involved in drafting the
1970 amendments.
107. Id.
108. There is a surprising dearth of published information about the cost of
scrubbers. One academic article published in 1988 estimated the capital
cost of controlling the fifty largest electric utility sources of sulfur oxide
pollution at $20 billion, or approximately $40 million per plant (in 1986
dollars). See William D. Baasel, Capital and Operating Costs of Wet
Scrubbers, 38 J. Air Pollution Control Ass’n 327–32 (1988). The
cost, however, depends on the size of plant being controlled, and some
claim that costs have come down by about 30% due to advances in
technology in recent years. See Scrubber Myths and Realities, Power
Engineering (Jan. 1, 1995), https://www.power-eng.com/1995/01/01/
scrubber-myths-and-realities/#gref [https://perma.cc/8VUE-FFYM].
109. See Cleaner Power Plants, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/mats/cleanerpower-plants [https://perma.cc/2CV4-SLPZ] (describing existing control
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This unintended consequence was eventually corrected not by
statutory amendment but by an aggressive litigation strategy led by
the EPA’s top air-enforcement attorney at the time, Bruce Buckheit,
and his allies at environmental-advocacy organizations, such as John
Walke at the Natural Resources Defense Council and Vickie Patton at
the Environmental Defense Fund.110 They filed enforcement cases first
against the largest coal-fired electric power plants in the Midwest—
winning billion-dollar settlements to install new, state-of-the art
pollution-control scrubbers on older coal-fired power plants—and later
against several other industries. In all, over 100 “new source review”
(NSR) enforcement cases were filed, almost all of which were eventually
settled with the polluters agreeing to install new pollution-control
technology.
The EPA’s legal theory was that these power plants and other
plants had been violating the law for many years by failing to apply for
prevention-of-significant-deterioration (PSD) permits which would
have required them to install the “best available control technology”
that was already required of their newer counterparts. Several of the
largest utility systems in the Midwest—Ohio Edison, Tennessee Valley
Authority, and the American Electric Power company—settled these
NSR cases by agreeing to install advanced pollution-control
technology.111 But one utility, Duke Power, litigated all the way to the
Supreme Court, where they lost in a unanimous decision.112
The issue in the NSR cases was the meaning of the following phrase
in the EPA’s regulations triggering PSD review: “any physical change
in or change in the method of operation of a major stationary source
that would result in . . . a significant net emissions increase.”113 At the
time, the regulations also contained an exemption for “routine
maintenance, repair, and replacement,” but the EPA came up with the
clever theory that if a plant was breaking down frequently, and thus
was only able to operate part of the time, there was an “increase in
emissions” if it were repaired and was then able to operate more of the

technologies to address toxic pollutants from power plants) (last updated
Mar. 4, 2019).
110. Dateline: Clearing the Air, (NBC television broadcast, Apr. 20, 2004),
available at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4759864/ns/dateline_nbc/#.X
oN9vS2ZPUp [https://perma.cc/Q92L-4AN9].
111. U.S. Announces Settlement of Landmark Clean Air Act Case Against
Ohio Edison, Dep’t of Just. (March 18, 2005), https://www.justice.gov/
archive/opa/pr/2005/March/05_enrd_129.htm [https://perma.cc/XMZ77FJP].
112. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 581–82 (2007).
113. 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(2)(i) (1987).
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time.114 This debate about which repairs were “routine” and which were
not also led to arcane arguments about whether, when repairing an
older plant, a company had to use “like-kind” components or whether
it could upgrade the broken parts with more modern equipment.115
When the NSR controversy finally reached the Supreme Court, the
Court boiled down the issues to whether the EPA could define an
increase in emissions on an hourly basis for the purposes of one section
of the statute (NSPS under section 111), but use a different annual
metric instead for an emissions increase for PSD purposes under a
different section of the statute (section 165).116 Sometimes, to state the
question is to answer it; the Supreme Court made short work of that
argument, holding that a word could have one meaning in one section
of the statute and a different meaning in another.117
But like the lead-in-gasoline saga, the issue did not go away after a
single EPA win in court. NSR has continued to be controversial, and
as recently as December 7, 2017, then-EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt
issued a controversial guidance document making technical changes for
how emissions increases are measured for PSD purposes.118 Part of the
underlying problem with the PSD program is that a plant has to apply
for a PSD permit before making the physical or operational changes in
question, so no one knows in advance exactly what its emissions will be
after the change.119 The EPA originally addressed this problem by
comparing the plant’s actual emissions before the change with its
“potential” emissions after the change, assuming the plant would
operate at full capacity, twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year, if it
had the legal right to do so under its permit.120 This is a conservative
worst-case approach because few, if any, sources of pollution actually
operate all of the time at full capacity.
Controversy surrounded the efforts of the second Bush
Administration, led by the OAR’s Assistant Administrator, Jeff
Holmstead, to substitute a comparison of a plant’s projected actual
emissions after a physical or operational change with its actual

114. Id. § 51.66(b)(2)(iii)(a), (f)(1)(iii).
115. Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 917 (7th Cir. 1990).
116. Envtl. Def., 549 U.S. at 570.
117. Id. at 573–74.
118. Memorandum from E. Scott Pruitt, Administrator, EPA, to Regional
Administrators 6 (Dec. 7, 2017), available at https://www.environmentallaw
andpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/452/2017/12/policy_memo.12.7
.171.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZLR-KER3].
119. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 309 n.1 (2014).
120. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 893 F.2d at 916.
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emissions before the change.121 Eventually, however, after notice-andcomment rulemaking and litigation, the comparison of past actual
emissions to projected future actual emissions was substituted for the
potential-emissions test, along with 105 pages of fine print containing
other technical policy changes.122 These technical changes made it easier
for most sources of air pollution to modify their operations without
triggering PSD review or the accompanying obligation to install best
available control technology. Nevertheless, controversy continues to
surround the NSR program to this day.123
Eventually the EPA largely got rid of grandfathering existing
plants out of stringent new technology-based standards by
interpretation and enforcement litigation,124 which is arguably good
from a policy perspective. But this policy change took a very long time,
and the battle still continues today because the law was being changed
by both court and agency interpretations with little or no participation
by Congress.
3. The Long Struggle Against Inter-State Air Pollution

One of the strongest arguments for federal, as opposed to state,
regulation of air pollution is that air pollution does not respect state
boundaries.125 Ironically, however, combatting these so-called “spill-over
effects” from one state to another has proved to be one of the most
recalcitrant air-pollution problems.
Despite Schoenbrod’s claim that in 1970 Congress “thought” most
air-pollution problems were local,126 the 1970 Clean Air Act
Amendments contained two provisions specifically designed to combat
inter-state air pollution: section 110(a)(2)(D)127 (the so-called “good

121. Art Fraas et al., EPA’s New Source Review Program: Time for Reform?,
47 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,026, 10,034–35 (2017).
122. Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New
Source Review (NSR): Baseline Emissions Determination, Actual-toFuture-Actual Methodology, Plantwide Applicability Limitations, Clean
Units, Pollution Control Projects, 67 Fed. Reg. 80,185, 80,188 (Dec. 31,
2002) (to be codified at 40 CFR pts. 51 & 52).
123. Fraas et al., supra note 121, at 10,039.
124. EPA, Fact Sheet: Implementation of the New Source Review
(NSR) Program for Particulate Matter Less Than 2.5
Micrometers (PM2.5)—Final Rule to Repeal Grandfather
Provision 1–2 (2011).
125. Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities,
144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2341, 2375 (1996); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing
Environmental Federalism, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 570, 625–26 (1996).
126. See supra text accompanying note 65.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (2012).
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neighbor provision”), and section 126.128 Under the former, the EPA is
not supposed to approve a state’s implementation plan if it permits a
pollution source to cause or contribute significantly to a violation of the
NAAQS in another state.129 Under the latter, a state may petition the
EPA to set emissions limits for specific out-of-state sources of air
pollution that significantly contribute to the nonattainment of or inter–
ference with maintaining one or more NAAQS in the petitioning state,
and the petitioning state may go to court if the EPA fails to do so.130
Unfortunately, neither section proved effective, largely because it is
very difficult to prove that air pollution originating in one state is
causing particular violations of the NAAQS in another state, which is
sometimes called the issue of “attribution.”131
In the 1990 amendments, Congress set up a process of regional
consultations in a thirteen-state Ozone Transport Region (OTR) in the
mid-Atlantic and East Coast states from Virginia to Maine, which were
collectively out of compliance with the NAAQS for ozone.132 The hope
was that the states could reach mutual agreements to reduce pollution,
and that this would become a model for other regional collaborations.
The states in turn set up an “Ozone Transport Commission,” a
voluntary organization that shared technical information among the
states and advised the EPA, but lacked any actual regulatory
authority.133 While these consultations among the states in the OTR
produced some coordinated actions and memoranda of understand–
ings134 to both reduce emissions from existing sources within the OTR
and take other coordinated actions, the group ultimately had to petition
the EPA to ratchet down emissions from eight upwind Midwest states
that it contended were contributing over half of the ozone pollution in
128. Id. § 7426.
129. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(1).
130. Id. § 7426.
131. See Kate C. Shouse, Cong. Research Serv., R45299, The Clean
Air Act’s Good Neighbor Provision: Overview of Interstate Air
Pollution Control 2 (2018) (describing the contribution to ozone
violations in downwind states of emissions originating in upwind states);
Treatment of Data Influenced by Exceptional Events, 81 Fed. Reg.
68,216, 68,225 n.17 (Oct. 3, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50 &
51) (identifying attribution as a component in analyzing violations).
132. Clean Air Act § 184(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7511c (2012).
133. OTC Process, Ozone Transport Comm’n, https://otcair.org/OTC_
process.asp [https://perma.cc/Y72A-LEH6] (last visited June 5, 2020).
134. Memorandum of Understanding Among the States of the Ozone Transport
Commission on Development of a Regional Strategy Concerning the Control
of Stationary Source Nitrogen Oxide Emissions (Sept. 27, 1994), available
at https://otcair.org/upload/Documents/Memorandums/att2.htm [https://
perma.cc/A94M-AG3N].
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the OTR.135 When the EPA denied that petition, the OTR states went
to court, where the matter is still pending.136
The EPA’s efforts to control another aspect of the interstatepollution problem involving the oxides of nitrogen (NOx), a precursor
for ozone formation, led the EPA in 1998 to issue a “NOx SIP call,”
requiring twenty-two states and the District of Columbia to reduce
their emissions of NOx by approximately 50% without attribution of
particular violations to particular individual pollution sources.137 That
action was largely upheld by the D.C. Circuit in 2000,138 over a vigorous
dissent by Judge Sentelle, who argued that the EPA should not have
considered “cost effectiveness” in deciding whether emissions in one
state contribute significantly to non-attainment in a downwind state.139
By 2005, it had become clear to the EPA that the 50% reduction from
the Clinton-era NOx SIP call would not be sufficient to bring the
downwind states into compliance,140 so under the Bush Administration,
the EPA issued the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR),141 which would
have required a 70% reduction in NOx from twenty-eight states, as well
as reductions in emissions of sulfur dioxides, which contribute to fineparticulate pollution.142 That rule was also challenged in the D.C.
Circuit, but this time it was held to be “fundamentally flawed” on
grounds very similar to those in Judge Sentelle’s previous dissent:
namely, that the EPA should not have considered cost effectiveness in
135. Petition to the United States Environmental Protection Agency for the
Addition of Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio,
Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia to the Ozone Transport Region
Established Pursuant to Section 184 of the Federal Clean Air Act as
Permitted by Section 176A of the Federal Clean Air Act (Dec. 9, 2013),
available at https://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/air_pdf/otrpetition1213.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W6G7-SXS5].
136. See Sonal Patel, Eight States Sue EPA, Arguing Ozone Transport Region
Decision Is “Unlawful”, Power (Dec. 28, 2017) https://www.powermag
.com/eight-states-sue-epa-arguing-ozone-transport-region-decision-isunlawful/ [https://perma.cc/9PZ5-AKXF]; see also Response to December 9,
2013, Clean Air Act Section 176A Petition from Connecticut, Delaware,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island and Vermont, 82 Fed. Reg. 51,238 (Nov. 3, 2017).
137. EPA, Fact Sheet: Final Rule for Reducing Regional Transport
of Ground-Level Ozone (Smog) and Two Related Proposals 1–
2, 7 (1998).
138. Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
139. Id. at 695.
140. Shouse, supra note 131, at 16.
141. Id.
142. Res., Sci., & Indus. Div., Cong. Research Serv., RL32927, Clean
Air Interstate Rule: Review and Analysis 1 (2005).
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making the threshold determination that emissions in one state cause
or contribute to violations of the NAAQS in another state.143 Strangely,
however, while remanding the rule to the EPA for reconsideration, the
court left major parts of it in effect in the meantime.144 The Obama
Administration then superseded the Bush Administration’s 70%
reductions with 71% reductions across twenty-seven states in the 2011
Cross State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR).145 That rule was finally
upheld by the Supreme Court in 2014, where the Court held that it was
permissible to considering cost effectiveness in deciding whether a state
causes or contributes to violations of pollution standards.146
In short, almost fifty years after Congress had mandated the EPA
to reduce emissions in states that were causing or contributing to
violations of air-pollution standards in other states, and twenty-two
years after the EPA got serious about addressing the issue in the 1998
NOx SIP, the agency finally got clearance from the courts to begin
making states actually revise their SIPs to impose such reductions by
attributing particular violations to particular sources—only to have the
EPA make further revisions to CSPR in 2016.147 The D.C. Circuit then
reviewed and remanded those revisions in 2019—this time for being too
lenient on the upwind states.148
The point is that the regulatory system under the Clean Air Act
has a great many “moving parts,” which provide numerous oppor–
tunities for judicial challenges and delays. Are the benefits of any
particular court decision worth the costs? I do not know, but it has
been fifty years and counting and we still have not eliminated the
problem of inter-state air pollution, which, as David Schoenbrod rightly
noted ten years ago, accounts for a significant portion of the non–
attainment problem.149 This experience contrasts sharply with the acid
rain training program mandated by Congress in the 1990 amendments,
which used economic incentives and actually achieved a 50% reduction

143. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 929–30 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
144. Id. at 930.
145. Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate
Matter and Ozone Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48, 208
(Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, and 97).
146. EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489 (2014).
147. Cross-State Air Pollution Rule Update for the 2008 Ozone NAAQS, 81
Fed. Reg. 74,504 (Oct. 26, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52, 78,
and 97).
148. Wisconsin v. EPA, 983 F.3d 303 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
149. Schoenbrod, supra note 53.
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in emissions of sulfur oxides from electric generating units in the twenty
years from 1990 to 2010.150
C.

Under Reliance on Economic Incentives

A final shortcoming of the Clean Air Act is the conspicuous absence
of economic incentives to supplement command-and-control regulation
in the EPA’s tool box. This is ironic because at the dawn of the
environmental era, the Nixon Administration proposed to address
sulfur-oxide pollution through a sulfur-oxides tax.151 The EPA, however,
has generally been allergic to charging polluters for the right to
pollute,152 insisting instead on giving away for free the right to pollute
while limiting the amount of pollution that can be released. It is
axiomatic in economics that when you charge for something, you get
less of that thing than when you give it away for free.153
An extensive academic literature argues in favor of greater use of
economic incentives to protect the environment,154 and I will not
150. See Pub. L. No. 101-541, 104 Stat. 2584 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7401
(2012)); Acid Rain Program: Overview, EPA, http://epa.gov/airmarkets/
acid-rain-program [https://perma.cc/EM4A-XKAF] (last updated Dec.
18, 2019).
151. E. W. Kenworthy, Nixon to Seek Tax on Sulphur Oxides Emitted by
Industry, N.Y. Times (Feb. 9, 1972), http://www.nytimes.com/1972/02/
09/archives/nixon-to-seek-tax-on-sulphur-oxides-emitted-by-industry-nixonto.html [https://perma.cc/Z3FQ-W3AH]; see also John C. Whitaker,
Striking a Balance: Environmental and Natural Resource Policy
in the Nixon–Ford Years (1976) (explaining the rationale for
important environmental policy).
152. Bruce A. Ackerman & Donald Elliott, Air Pollution ‘Rights’, N.Y. Times
(Sept. 11, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/09/11/opinion/airpollutionrights.html [https://perma.cc/77R4-B33Q] (“The E.P.A. should, instead,
sell polluters the right to dirty the air for a fixed period—just as the
Government now auctions off oil and gas leases to the highest bidders. If
polluters were forced to pay, they would clean up to avoid the cost—and
breathers, not industry, would profit. The public would not stand for a
multibilliondollar give-away of public lands or water to industry. Why
should the air be different?”); see also Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky?,
19 Pace Envtl L. Rev. 515 (2002) (discussing public ownership of
natural resources).
153. Al Ehrbar, Supply, Libr. of Econ. & Liberty, http://www.econlib.org/
library/Enc/Supply.html [https://perma.cc/VT5Q-KTGZ] (“the law of
demand . . . says that the quantity of a good demanded falls as the price
rises”) (last visited June 5, 2020).
154. See, e.g., John H. Dales, Pollution, Property, and Prices (1968);
W. David Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution
Control Programs, 5 J. Econ. Theory 395 (1972); Bruce A. Ackerman
et al., The Uncertain Search for Environmental Quality (Free
Press, 1974); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming
Environmental Law, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1333 (1985); see also Hugh
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rehearse those arguments here. Nor will I venture into the internecine
warfare between the proponents of tradeable rights and proponents of
emissions charges.155 Both types of economic incentives share a feature
that has been underappreciated: they take effect immediately and
incentivize polluters to look for ways to change their practices to reduce
their pollution, thereby reducing their costs. This feature is particularly
important in light of the long delays in implementing actual pollution
reductions.156 On the other hand, it is arguable that traditional
command-and-control regulation, at least with judicial review, creates
perverse incentives to try to delay for as long as possible the “day of
reckoning” when one must actually spend money to install pollutioncontrol equipment. One wonders whether, if the Nixon Administration’s
sulfur oxides tax has been enacted, it would have taken fifty years to
reduce interstate pollution of sulfur oxides. The example of the acid
rain-trading program, while admittedly not directly on point, suggests
but does not prove that economic incentives, if set at a reasonable level,
might well have reduced pollution more rapidly and more efficiently
than traditional command-and-control rulemaking.
To some extent, the EPA’s reluctance to impose emissions fees as
well as command-and-control limits on pollution arose from an
unfortunate legal opinion that I wrote in 1990 when I was the EPA’s
General Counsel.157 The opinion expressed doubt about whether the
EPA could collect pollution fees without running afoul of the general
prohibition against agencies “supplement[ing] appropriations” without
the specific authority to do so from Congress.158 Unfortunately, at the
time, I was ignorant of the 1952 Independent Offices Appropriation
Act,159 which gives all executive branch agencies, including the EPA,
the authority to charge “user fee[s] . . . for a service or product whose
distribution it controls.”160 I have recently attempted to correct my
Gorman, & Barry Solomon, The Origins and Practice of Emissions
Trading, 14 J. Pol’y Hist. 293 (2002) (outlining the move from theory
to practice in using economic incentives in environmental law).
155. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Effluent Charges: A Critique, 6 Canadian J.
Econ. 512 (1973), reprinted in Benefit-Cost and Policy Analysis
1974 (Richard Zeckhauser et al. eds., 1975).
156. See supra Part II.B (giving examples of environmental policies that
endured extensive delays before enforcement).
157. Elliott, supra note 12, app. at 10,923.
158. Id.
159. Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat. 877, 1051 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 9701(b)
(2012)).
160. Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal
and Economic Analysis, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 795, 800 (1987); see also Nat’l
Cable Television Ass’n, 415 U.S. 336, 340–41 (1974) (noting that the
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unfortunate error by pointing out that the EPA does have general
authority to impose user fees for allowing polluters to dispose of
residuals from their production processes into the public’s air.161
But the causes of the EPA’s unwillingness to impose fees for using
the public’s air for waste-disposal purposes go deeper into the agency’s
culture and expertise than just one erroneous legal opinion regarding
its legal authority to do so. Bureaucrats who are used to establishing
legal rules that require tangible add-on pollution-control equipment
have more faith in that approach than in the invisible hand of the
market. Even when Congress enacted in 1990 a mandatory requirement
for a charge on emissions in addition to other measures in severely
polluted nonattainment areas,162 the EPA declined to implement it.
Although the law requiring emissions charges in severe nonattainment
areas was on the books, according to someone who was there—Rob
Brenner, who was the head of EPA’s influential Office of Air Policy and
Program Support at the time—the EPA could never muster the
“necessary political support” to enforce it.163 In fairness, by that time it
was increasingly clear that many nonattainment problems were caused
not by local polluters or recalcitrant local officials, but by pollution
coming in from upwind states.164 Imposing additional financial charges
on major industries in nonattainment areas in the New England and
the Mid-Atlantic states would have done nothing to reduce pollution
blowing in from the Midwest, for example.
Fourteen years after enacting the emissions-fee-requirement, the
EPA purported to “waive” that fee for emissions charges in severely
polluted non-attainment areas,165 but it was sued and ordered to comply
with the law.166 Since that time, the EPA has grudgingly applied the
law, while still trying to give states as much flexibility as it can to
regulatory scheme imposed by Congress was meant to benefit the public);
Hugh D. Spitzer, Taxes vs. Fees: A Curious Confusion, 38 Gonz. L. Rev.
335 (2003) (analyzing constitutional restraints on how taxes and fee
structures can be applied); Erin Adele Scharff, Green Fees: The Challenge
of Pricing Externalities Under State Law, 97 Neb. L. Rev. 168 (2018)
(discussing similar issues under state law).
161. Elliott, supra note 12; see also Torres, supra note 152 (arguing that air
resources are held in trust for the public which should benefit from their
use).
162. Clean Air Act § 185, 42 U.S.C. § 7511d (2012).
163. Personal communication.
164. See supra notes 127–131 and accompanying text (describing the pollution
from upwind states).
165. 69 Fed. Reg. 23,951 (Apr. 30, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 50, 51,
and 81).
166. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. EPA, 472 F.3d 882, 905 (D.C. Cir.
2006).
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disregard that part of the law through “an equivalent alternative
program” such as requiring more low-emission vehicles rather than
imposing emissions charges.167
Perhaps the larger lesson is that emissions charges in addition to
command-and-control regulation are unlikely to be acceptable
politically. That may also be the lesson from the use of the “cap and
tax” epithet to kill the Waxman–Markey bill.168 So the political problem
is how to make emissions charges into a “win-win.” How about offering
polluters a choice: if they can figure out a way to reduce their pollution
below what they are permitted to emit under existing command-andcontrol regulation, they can opt out of the present system, provided
that they pay emissions charges on whatever pollution they continue to
emit? That is a policy that might just appeal to both environmentalists
and the Trump Administration because it results in lower emissions as
well as cutting bureaucratic red tape.

Conclusion
One hundred years ago, the prophet of today’s regulatory approach,
James Landis, was a young professor of legislation at Harvard Law
School. Landis wondered aloud why “admirable intentions of
legislation” often ended with “perverse results.”169 His answer was that
flaws in carrying out policy were due to legislation being implemented
by generalist judges and legislatures who did not understand the
specifics of the areas they were trying to regulate, but instead relied too
much on formal rules.170 Landis’s fix was the creation of “the
administrative,” governmental specialists who understood the area to
be regulated by virtue of continuity and expertise.171 The current
administrative state in general, and the EPA’s air program in
particular, are the culmination of Landis’s vision of regulation imple–
mented by experts.
A candid assessment would acknowledge that the EPA’s effort to
regulate air pollution has made definite progress toward cleaning up the
167. Memorandum from Stephen Page, supra note 14.
168. See John M. Broder, ‘Cap and Trade’ Loses Its Standing as Energy Policy
of Choice, N.Y. Times (Mar. 25, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/
03/26/science/earth/26climate.html [https://perma.cc/6YSC-BLL6]
(quoting Myron Ebell of the Competitive Enterprise Institute, a leading
adviser to President Trump and head of his 2017 EPA transition team,
as saying “[w]e turned [cap and trade] into ‘cap and tax,’ and we turned
that into an epithet”).
169. Thomas K. McGraw, Prophets of Regulation 172 (1984).
170. Id.
171. James O. Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28 Admin.
L. Rev. 363, 364 (1976).
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air during its fifty-year history. In this sense, it is definitely at least a
qualified success. But at the same time, the inability of the EPA’s air
program to address GHGs effectively over a generation or more is an
obvious shortcoming. Even at its best, regulation of air pollution has
been slow, cumbersome, and expensive. It often takes twenty-five years
or more to accomplish even modest goals, and according to the EPA,
after fifty years, one-third of the population of the country still lives in
areas where the air violates national air quality standards.172
Most of the shortcomings of the air program are due to its exclusive
reliance on the method of “legalistic bureaucracy,” primarily noticeand-comment rulemaking followed by judicial review and case-by-case
enforcement. But regulation of air pollution has also been hamstrung
by a lack of consistent political support, which has rarely been
forthcoming as administrations come and go and political support
fluctuates.173
Like Landis, it is time to ask whether we can do better, and if so,
how. This Article argues that emissions fees imposed by a bureaucracy
that does not have to stand for reelection every two years would be
better able to achieve the environmental progress that we all seem to
want in the abstract but sometimes resist when it comes to specifics.
One of the key functions of the administrative state is to do the things
that need to be done but cannot muster a majority in a popularly
elected legislature. The difficulty in getting sensible policies adopted
often results because the “losers” from any particular pollution-control
policy are concentrated and willing to invest a lot to stop it, whereas
the beneficiaries are diffuse and have less at stake on any particular
initiative.174
It is time to move beyond the legal fiction that the administrative
state is merely executing instructions from Congress. In fact, Congress
often delegates decisions to the administrative state to “do the right
thing” precisely because Congress cannot, either because it does not
know enough, or because Congress needs the deniability that comes
from being able to blame the bureaucracy.175
172. See supra note 16 (explaining how the U.S. population is currently
situated).
173. See Elliott, supra note 66 (describing the causes of lack of bipartisan
support for expanding environmental regulation since the 1992 election).
174. See generally George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell
J. Econ. 3 (1971) (discussing how concentrated minorities may win out
politically over majorities with less at stake).
175. See David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How
Congress Abuses the People Through Delegation (1993; 1995
paperback) (discussing how Congress avoids responsibility by delegating
decisions to administrative agencies).
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